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THE AFRICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION OF A
SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL OF INTEGRATION
ALVIN W. WOLFE
Washington University
over Africa was fairly halted for a
time at the point where minerals be-
come important, I found the mineral
extraction industry of southern Africa
to be organized in an intricate social
system based more on overlapping
membership of a variety of groups
than on a bureaucratic centralization
of administrative power. The network
binds groups that are different both
structurally and functionally, some
business corporations, some states,
some families, in a modern suprana-
tional structure that is more than just
international. The ties among these
entities are such that the boundaries
of the system are ambiguous. Though
operating in a complex modern world,
the structure of this system appears to
the anthropologist analgous to "acepha-
lous'. segmentary social systems. An
even better comparison might be with
such smaller societies as those of abo-
riginal Australia where networks of
overlapping family, horde, and totemic
groups provide a high degree of order
without centralized control.
Before proceeding, I should register
some reservations. A system such as
this is difficult to describe briefly. This
preliminary report, based on incom-
plete data on a system that is dynamic,
continuously adapting to changing
conditions, attempts only to point out
a few salient features which appear
important for the future development
of this system, and to point out some
of those changing conditions tO which
this system seems adaptable.
SOME PA1TERNS OF INTEGRAnON
IN THE MINING INDUSTRY
The several hundred mining com-
panies operating in southern Africa
are integrated through a series of re-
lationships that focus on some of the
larger among them-this system I have
elsewhere called the Cape-to-Katanga
The need for some sort of human
organization at a level of integration
superior to the war-prone nation-state
has stimulated rational attempts to in-
vent structUres intended to reduce in-
ternational conflict. These inventions,
such as the League of Nations and the
United Nations, tend tO use the very
units that are in contention, nation-
states, and the same principles of or-
ganization, centralized power in a bu-
reaucratic framework, that characterize
the nation-state. The long history of
development of human social systems
suggests, however, that development
from one "level of sociocultUral inte-
gration," to use the concept of Julian
Steward,l to a new, wider level in-
volves the emergence qf genuinely dif-
ferent principles which yield qualita-
tively different groups at the higher
level. A tribe is not a federation of
families; a nation is not a federation
of tribes; neither is it likely that man's
present problem will be solved by a
federation of states. It may be that the
current decades of enormous upheaval,
of crumbling political empires, of
rapid social change and" population
growth, and of acceleration of indus-
trialization, will give rise tO some new
system of social control somewhat in-
dependent of the currently troublesome
units, the nation-states. The present
paper does not purport to describe a
utopian system for establishing world
peace. It merely calls attention to a de-
veloping system with some character-
istics that might make effective an in-
ternational, supranational, integrative
system.
In pursuing answers to quite anoth-
er question, namely, why the "wind of
change" expected to sweep southward
1 Julian Steward, Theory of Culture
Change. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1955.
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exploitation of all the mineral re-
sources of southern Africa. These "key"
companies are: Union Miniere du
Haut Katanga, Tanganyika Conces-
sions, British South Africa Company,
Anglo American Corporation of South
Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines,
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Company, R h o k a n a Corporation,
Mufulira Copper Mines, and Rhode-
sian Selection Trust. ( See Chart 1. )
Eighty-eight men occupy the 130 di-
rectOrships; still closer to the hub, six
men occupy twenty-tWo seats. Analysis
of the relationships of these, and many
other related corporations, suggests that
the interlocking may follow a regular
pattern: roughly, the units which are
most similar in function and therefore
most prone to compete have the high-
est degree of interlocking. Those that
are functionally disparate can rely more
on the market principle in their rela-
tions, while the similar companies must
create the conditions for cooperation
on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, Rho-
kana and Rhodesian Selection Trust
are alike in their emphasis on mining
copper in the Copperbelt, but they
avoid the temptation to compete by
interlocking heavily through a third
company, Mufulira Copper Mines,
whose sixteen man board is nearly
filled by nine directors of Rhodesian
Selection Trust and six directors of
Rhokana. On the other hand, the Brit-
ish South Africa Company, whose
place in the system is functionally
unique in that it does not operate
mines but "owns" the mineral resources
over vast parts of the territory includ-
ing the Copperbelt, needs only three
joint directors with Anglo American
Corporation of South Africa and only
one with Tanganyika Concessions. It
may, however, be significant that the
three of them-BSA, Anglo-American,
and T.C.-together own the Rhodesian
Iron and Steel Corporation ( RISCO )
of Southern Rhodesia. Tanganyika
Concessions, itself, has another func-
tionally distinct position in that it
Miners.2 Then, in a variety of ways,
these corporations are linked with gov-
ernmentS.
The most direct connections are
those of parent companies to wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Thus The Anglo
American Corporation of South Africa
is sole parent to Lydenburg Estates,
New Era Consolidated, South African
Mines Selection, Anglo American Rho-
desian Services, and Anmercosa Land
and Estates.3 Johannesburg Consoli-
dated Investment Company is parent
to African Asbestos-Cement Corpora-
tion, Barnato Brothers, Barnato Hold-
ings, and others. Such relationship sys-
tems based on complete ownership are,
of course, limited in scale in the same
way as kinship groups based on filia-
tion alone are limited.
The relationships that give this sys-
tem much wider span involve the shar-
ing of interest in operating firms. Just
as marriages in many social systems
establish affinal ties between two other-
wise separate, perhaps opposing, line-
ages, common financial interests estab-
lish a network of relations between
otherwise distinct corporations. This
network is partially expressed in inter-
locking directorates, for any business
group attempts to have its own repre-
sentatives on the board of directors of
another company in which it holds
stock or has some other direct interest.
The extent to which this principle
operates can be readily observed from
the lists of directors of nine companies
chosen as key companies from among
the several hundred for which such in-
formation is available because they,
with their subsidiaries and associated
firms, can be seen as dominating the
2 Alvin W. Wolfe, "The Team Rules
Mining in Southern Africa," Toward Free-
dom, January, 1962.
3 Unless other references are ,given, all
p.trticulars on companies are taken from
( 1) tllining Year Book, London: Walter
E. Skinner; (2) Moody's Banking and Fi-
nance Manual; (3) Moody's Industrials
Manual; or (4) Poor's Register,
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156 SOCIAL PROBLEMS
owns, in addition to much of Union
Miniere du Haut Katanga, the Ben-
guela Railway, in collaboration with
the Portuguese government.
In the American economy, we may
need to be reminded, interlocking of
directorates is greatest among function-
ally different corporations ( except, of
course, in the parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship) .That the pattern tends tO be
the opposite in this international, or
supranational, system may be impor-
tant enough to be re-emphasized. Be-
tween firms that are functionally dis-
tinct there already exists something
like organic solidarity, what economic
anthropologists would call integration
according to the market principle. Be-
tweeri those that do not need each
other instrumentally, integration based
on the principle of reciprocity is de-
veloped by the mechanism of interlock-
ing directorates.
INVOLVEMENT OF STATES IN THE
SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEM
The companies forming the core of
this supranational industrial system
have usually been referred to as "pri-
vate" companies and their economic
activity attributed to the "private sec-
tor" as opposed tO the "public sector"
of the various "national economies" in
which they function. It is important,
however, to analyze carefully the status-
es and roles of states in a ..supranation-
al" system such as we are describing.
American scholars, especially, may need
to be cautioned not tO expect all busi-
ness and government relations to fol-
low the American ideal of "separation."
In southern Africa, at least, states and
business corporations have long been
closely interwoven, sometimes identi-
cal-as in the case of King Leopold's
International Association of the Congo
which was a private business until the
United States Government recognized
it as "a friendly power," opening the
way tO its reconstitution as the Congo
Independent State in 1885.4
The Congo government, under Leo.
pold and then under the Belgians,
owned significant holdings in the "pri-
vate sector," in companies like Union
Miniere, Forminiere, Geomines, and
others. In fact, over the years, income
from direct business investments ac-
couQted for something like 7% of
total government receipts.5 As any oth-
er stockholder, the Government under
the Belgians could vote its shares in
the election of directors and other cru-
cial corporate matters. We shall look
more specifically at the Congo sitUation
later, when consideration is given to
the effects on this supranational system
of the break-up of political empires.
Another state which participates in
the Cape-to-Katanga team is PortUgal.
The government of the Province of
Angola holds 200,000 shares in the
Companhia de Diamante de Angola
(Diamang), which has monopoly
rights to diamond deposits. On the
board of this company are H. J. Joel
of De Beers, H. F. Oppenheimer of
Anglo American, Baron Bonvoisin of
the societe Generale de Belgique,
Comte M. de Fernig of the societe
Miniere du Beceka ( significant in that
it is the largest single diamond-pro-
ducer in the world, located in the Con-
go). All diamonds produced by
Diamang are distributed through The
Diamond Corporation, a De Beers sub-
sidiary that administers the cartel ar-
rangementS. Aside from the regular
benefits the PortUguese government of
Angola derives by 50% participation
in profits of the company, the Diamang
4 Anthony S. Reyner, The Republic of
the Congo, Development of its Interna-
tional Boundaries ( African Reprint Series,
No. 9)- Institute of African Affairs, Du-
quesne University, 1961) .
5 J. Wertz, in Organisation financiere du
Congo Beige et du Ruana-Urundi, Extrait
de L 'Encyclopedie du Congo Beige, Brux-
elles, 1953; and Banque Centrale du Congo
BeIge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Rapport, 1959,
Bruxelles, 1960.
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Rhodesia Railways and the Kariba
hydroelectric power system. The Brit-
ish South Africa Company holds the
Rhodesia Railways bonds, issued at the
time of its nationalization immediately
after World War II. The Railways, as
a government agency, financed renova-
tion and expansion by borrowing in
the United States and from the Inter-
national Bank. The Kariba Project, too,
was financed heavily by the Interna-
tional Bank, in which the American
government is the major participant.6
The role of the government of South
Africa in the supranational system we
call the Cape-to-Katanga Miners is
enormous, but at the same time so
complicated by other political dimen-
sions as tO demand much more discus-
sion than can be undertaken here. Min-
erals made South Africa, minerals
maintain South Africa, and South
Africa is the axle on which fits the
hub of the mineral industry of all
southern Africa. Almost half of all the
companies directly involved in the
Cape-to-Katanga mineral industry are
registered in South Africa. Despite
that government's unsavory record
relative to freedom of persons, it
acquired a fine reputation among
capital inyestors, inspiring American
businessmen to speak publicly in glow-
ing terms of the possibilities for in-
vestment.7 The American Export-Im-
port Bank loaned $127,000,000 to a
6 Loans to Rhodesia Railways and the
Kariba power project are discussed in sev-
eral issues of The Annual Report of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, especially the Eleventh
(1955-56, p. 40) and the Thirteenth
(1957-58, pp. 24-25). In addition, Andrew
Kamarck reports, "The United States gov-
ernment has put $56 million into Rhodesia
to help develop copper and cobalt mining
and to improve road and railway transport"
(p. 130, The United States and Africa, The
American Assembly, New York, 1958) .
7 See, for example, "The Pied Piper of
Inland Steel;' Africa Today, March, 1963;
see also the South African government's
publication South African Scope, wherein
American statements are frequently cited.
board was involved enough in political
affairs tO loan the government $3,-
500,000 in 1955 at 1% interest.
The Portuguese government is part-
ner to another important firm of the
Cape-to-Katanga System operating in
Angola. Tanganyika Concessions Limit-
ed shares with the government of An-
gola control of the Benguela Railway,
the most efficient route to the Atlantic
from Katanga and the Rhodesian Cop-
perbelt. Since Tanganyika Concessions
is, with the societe Generale de Bel-
gique, an important shareholder in
Union Miniere, it is clear that they
have an interest in how Angola is
governed.
The governments of the Rhodesias
were, in their beginnings, purely "pri-
vate'. business, namely The British
South Africa Company. Those ties are
by no means all dissolved. In Northern
Rhodesia the mineral rights are still
held by that company, which grants
concessions to operating companies
such as Rhodesian Selection Trust,
Mufulira, Nchanga, and many others,
each with its nexus tO the supranation-
al system. The company, or the Cape-
to-Katanga Supranational System, more
than the government, controls the ex-
ploitation of minerals in Northern
Rhodesia.
In Southern Rhodesia, matters are
different. There the mineral rights
were purchased by the government, a
"white" government, from the British
South Africa Company in 1933, so that
the government, not the company,
grants concessions and receives royal-
ties. It is not irrelevant to note that
Africans are not likely tO win political
power here, in "Zimbabwe," with any-
thing like the ease with which the
transfer took place in Zambia (North-
ern Rhodesia) or Malawi (Nyasaland)
where direct control of minerals was
not involved.
The now-defunct government of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
was a major participant in the mining
industry, through its control of the
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Africans and some thousands of whites
who are opposed to it-because it has
the financial and diplomatic resources
of the vast mineral industry. I add
"diplomatic resources'. advisedly, since
these great corporations, organized
supranationally, exert strong though
subtle influences-as a case in point,
the American governmental loans tO
Anglo American subsidiaries at 4%
interest at the same time as Anglo
American was loaning tO its own affili-
ates at 6V2%, and at the same time
as a related company, Diamang, loaned
to Portugal at 1 %. This kind of diplo-
macy shores up the South African state,
as well as the Portuguese state, as well
as the Cape-to-Katanga Miners.
Those who see only the enormous
growth of state power in the modern
world apparently do not take into ac-
count the large number of weak states
now existing, and the difficulties states
encounter in attempting to form
stronger units by federation. States
cannot readily form overlapping sys-
tems among themselves. They can and,
as we have seen, do overlap with
supranational corporations.
BOUNDARIES OF THE
SuPRANAnoNAL SYSTEM
Defining the boundaries of the be-
havioral system we are here attempting
to analyze entails difficulties similar
to those met in defining effective po-
litical boundaries for societies without
state structures-the Nuer of Sudan,
the Tallensi of Ghana, or the aboriginal
Australians, for example. In the min-
ing industry, as in some small societies,
controlled cooperation simply becomes
weaker as one moves from the point
of focus outward. Familiar with such
systems, anthropologists are not likely
tO conclude that systematic organiza-
tion is not present where boundaries
are ambiguous. Rather, this can be seen
as a characteristic of the system-and
may even prove of adaptive value in
that it permits expansion when the
conditions are right and tends to pre-
number of South African gold mining
companies at the rate of 4% interest
in the 1950's.8 The U. S. Atomic Ener-
gy Commission, which guaranteed the
loans, reported the development in the
following terms in its report pubJished
in 1953: "Over a period of years, the
South African government and mining
industry, in cooperation with the
United States and the United King-
dom, have Jaid the groundwork for an
entirely new industry which recovers
uranium as a by-product from the gold
ores of Witwatersrand."9 The report
fails tO note that in addition to laying
"the groundwork," the governments
also supplied the capital and absorbed
the risk by guaranteeing to buy the
product at a price fixed tO permit
amortization and "reasonable" profit.l0
Participation of governments, includ-
ing that of South Africa, in the mineral
industry is clear, and this is our only
interest at this point.
A state, of course, has considerable
bargaining power vis a vis other social
units, such as corporations, operating
within their territories. The govern-
ment of a state, after all, has the ..legiti-
mate" right to use force. When it
occurs that the force of the state de-
pends heavily on monies that come pre-
dominantly from one corporation or a
systematically organized group of cor-
porations, it is the government which
may be regulated. Governments in
Africa are weak in just this way.
The government of The Republic of
South Africa is certainly the strongest
government in the area of our con-
cern. It is strong, however-and there-
fore can effectively oppress 8,000,000
8 Export-Import Bank, Report to CO1l-
gress, annually.9 Atomic Energy Commission, Thirteenth
.'it!11Iiannual Report. Washin~ton: .U. S.
Printing Office, January, 1953, p. 7.
10 See also AEC Tu'enty-third !'.e11Ii-
d1Jliual Report, 1958, p. 450; also Hearing.l
before the Joint Committee on Atorrlic
Energy, Eighty-fifth Congress of the United
States, 1958, pp. 20-21 and passim.
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serve the center, and thus the system
itself, when conditions are adverse.
The nine corporations taken as the
focus of the southern African mining
industry derive their importance from
their relationships with the several
hundred other corporations and states
operating in the area and then, further,
with producers and processors of min-
erals in other areas of the world. It is
impossible here to list all these rela-
tionships, but some indication of the
way in which they move toward in-
finity can be given. Union Miniere in
Katanga is now effectively controlled
by the societe Generale de Belgique.
The societe Generale shares with De
Beers, Anglo American Corporation
of South Africa, and the Portuguese
state, control of the Diamond Com-
pany of Angola. But most of the ac-
tivity of societe Generale is in Europe,
where it links with some of the largest
industrial and financial groups in the
world.ll One of the numerous lines
that could be followed leads through
a subsidiary, societe Generale des
Minerais, with ties connecting it to
Amalgamated Metal Corporation in
the United Kingdom. societe Gen-
erale des Minerais, together with its
parent, created a company in Can~da,
Sogemines limited, among whose in-
terests are significant holdings in Rio
Tinto Mining Company of Canada, a
subsidiary of Rio Tinto Co. limited,
part of the Rothschild group in the
United Kingdom. Rio Tinto, according
to the Mining Yearbook, "has interests
in Northern Rhodesia of which the
most important is its large holding of
shares in Rhokana Corporation Limit-
ed. ..." It also has interests in South
African mines. Tracing the intercon-
nections among the groups involved in
the mineral field reveals circles in cir-
des and circles intersecting circles, so
that one cannot say, at any point, this
is where the system ends, all these are
in, all those are out.
"ACEPHALOUS" CHARACTER OF
THE SYSTEM
Despite the evidence of an orderly
system, the mineral industry of south-
ern Africa cannot be said to be under
the willful control of a few men at
the apex of a bureaucratic hierarchy.
In other words, it is not run by a few
"evil-minded malefactors of great
wealth." Certainly, differences in power
are present between corporations and
between men, but there is no evidence,
even in the more formally organized
segment of the system known as the
diamond cartel, that one man or one
company controls directly the actions
of others. Though here much research
remains to be done, the cooperation
among the units in the system appears
dependent on shared interests and
shared information throughout the in-
tricate network. Copper production in
1961 was ostensibly geared down in
the Copperbelt region in order to con-
form tO the world market, even though
thc: copper industry has no formal con-
$tol agency comparable to that pro-
vided by the Diamond Corporation for
the diamond industry. Concerning the
use of the several rail routes to the
sea, attempts are made to satisfy the
various states and corporations in-
volved although there is no "ministry
of transportation" to order such co-
operation.
Granted that our information on the
lines of authority within the structure
is at this point scanty, it appears cer-
tain there is no single ruler, private
or public. Yet this "tribe" pursues its
goals with enough efficiency to contin-
ue tO profit and expand. A positive ad-
vantage of this acephalous character
is that any sort of a coup d' etat is im-
possible, as is destruction of the whole
system by disintegration of the execu-
tive institUtion.
11 For more complete particulars on the
extensions of societe Generale, the reader
is advised to see Morphologie des Groupes
Financiers, Brussels: Centre de Rocherche
et d'lnformation Socio-Politiques, 1962.
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EvoLUnONARY PROCESSES
From this altogether tOO brief ex-
position of some structUral aspects of
the system of mineral exploitation let
us turn to view the matter in evolu-
tionary perspective. Three on-going
processes tend to foster the develop-
ment of the system: First, the process
of industrialization, pursuing man in
every part of the earth, will continu-
ously enlarge the already great demand
for minerals. Second, the continuing
process of political decolonization en-
hances the freedom of action of this
essentially private system. Third, the
lowering of state-imposed barriers to
trade leaves the arena freer for the ac-
tion of supranational economic organi-
zations.
The rapid development of industrial
systems in the twentieth century intro-
duces important new factors into the
ecological system within which man
operates. The idea that increasing pro-
ductivity is desirable has spread wher-
ever men are. Once on the road to-
ward higher productivity through in-
dustrialization there appears no turn-
ing back, no levelling off, without dis-
aster. An important meaning of this
is seldom recognized. In twentieth
centUry ecological systems, minerals
have become as necessary tO the main-
tenance of human industrial systems
as food is to human biological systems.
Without losing sight of the fact that
all mankind is becoming involved in
industrial systems, let us focus for a
moment on one small segment of the
species, the men in Europe. A fully
industrialized society seems compelled
tO expand its economy. We may argue
whether gross national product must
grow at 2%, 5% or 10%, but we
agree it must grow. All predictions
for western Europe are for growth.
Dewhurst and his associates, in a sig-
nificant volume entitled Europe's
Needs and Resources, foresee a 150%
increase in the European GNP by
1970, over the 1957 level. Another
stUdy, Britain and Europe, by The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,
reaches similar conclusions for 1970,
but adds that, with free trade, the
growth rate should become gradually
steeper after that.12 The optimism ap-
pears typical of economic analyses.
The projected growth in Europe will
not be distributed evenly over all sec-
tors of the economy, but will occur
strongly in the area of modern metal-
lurgical processing. Europe has done
well in the past by processing imported
primary products, and further progress
in the same direction is expected.
"From the standpoint of minerals,
metals, and metalworking production,
the future is no more than an exten-
sion of the past."13
How does all this affect the mineral-
exploiting system of southern Africa?
Such growth in Europe should effect
major changes in the demand sched-
ule for ferroalloys and nonferrous
metals. By 1970, just around the
corner, consumption in Europe alone
of the major ferroalloys "can reason-
ably be expected to double the 1955
level." The bulk of Europe's doubled
need for ferroalloys will be expected to
come from Africa. Africa has almost
25% of the world supply of manga-
nese, while Europe has 1 %. Africa
contains almost 20% of the world
supply of chromite, while western
Europe has 1 %. Africa has 60% of
the world's cobalt while western Eu-
rope has 10%.
Europe's trade in nonferrous metals
will double between 1955 and 1970,
according to projections, and the grow-
ing need will have to be met from
African resources.14 Copper consump-
tion will double, and it is expected
that Katanga and the Copperbelt will
remain the principal source of supply.
12 ]. Frederick Dewhurst, et al., Europe's
Needs and Resources, Twentieth Century
Fund, New York, 1957; Britain and Europe,
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,London, 1957. .
13 Dewhurst, op. cit.
14 Britain and Europe, p. 78.
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tremendous influence on the rest of the
world. The government was in busi-
ness, and business was good for the
seventy years that Belgians manned
governmental posts. What was handed
over to the Congolese on June 30,
1960, however, was a meager skeleton
of administrative structure stripped of
its muscle and therefore heavily de-
pendent on European businessmen
members of the supranational mining
network.
The key to the Congo sitUation is
the charter company, Katanga Special
Committee, in which the government
had the right to appoint four of six
directors. Among its many holdings
was Union Miniere, the importance of
which is indicated by the fact that it
produced annually for the Congo pub-
lic treasury an amount nearly equal to
half the annual budget. The dividends,
royalties, and taxes of other mining
companies in similar relation to the
state must also be considered, but of
these the contribution of Union
Miniere is the largest. The Katanga
Special Committee owned 663,000
voting shares of Union Miniere, while
minority shareholders wer~"Xanganyika
Concessions with 375,000 shares and
the societe Generale de Belgique with
129,000 shares.15
Instead of appointing, through the
medium of the Special Committee, di-
rectors of Union Miniere who would
put public interest foremost, the gov-
ernment always named men represent-
ing the minority interests, especially
the societe Generale de Belgique. Re-
ciprocally, retiring government officials
were given berths on subsidiary cor-
porations. In 1960, with the wind of
change bringing independence to the
Zinc consumption will probably be
one-and-a-half times the 1957 level by
1970, and Katanga is the major source.
Tin, still indispensable for a number
of uses, is concentrated in Africa, prob-
ably as much as 50% of the "Free
World" supply. Cadmium has come
largely from the Katanga-Rhodesia
area.
Add to this projection for Europe
the increased need for the same min-
erals resulting from the growth of in-
dustrial systems allover the world, and
the dimensions of the ecological prob-
lem can be appreciated.
To the degree that minerals will be
relatively more important in the years
to come, those who control thelll, or
rather the systems involving their con-
trol, will have enhanced influence in
what we now call international affairs.
Representatives of political states may
well become less influential than repre-
sentatives of such functionally neces-
sary supranational systems as the
"Cape-to-Katanga Miners."
Although European state power ob-
viously made possible the establish-
ment of such control over mineral re-
sources as is exercised in southern
Africa, the current disintegration of
colonial empires serves more to
strengthen than to weaken the "pri-
vate" sector of the system. National
state controls have frequently been
used tO inhibit development of wider-
scale economic integration, since each
corporation operates under a charter
from one or another nation-state. Dis-
solution of colonial ties strengthens the
position, relative to states, of corpora-
tions whose operations are sufficiently
internationalized.
The Congo provides a clear case, al-
most too extreme to use as a general
example, of weakening of state power
relative tO private "international" cor-
porations. By virtue of its colonial
charter, the Belgian-administered gov-
ernment of the Congo had almost com-
plete control over the economic destiny
of that richly endowed land and a
15 Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, Les
Trusts au Congo, societe Populaire d'Edi-
tions, Brussels, 1961, pp. 290-294. Slightly
different figures are found in Morphologie
des Groupes Financiers, Centre de Recherche
er d'Information Socio-Politiques, Brussels,
1962, p. 153, but the proportions are ap-
proximately the same.
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Congo, one might have predicted that
an African government would remedy
the situation in the public favor. The
independent Congolese government
was never given the opportUnity to
make such appointments, however, for
only days before the Lumumba govern-
ment was sworn in the Katanga Spe-
cial Committee was dissolved, or ren-
dered inoperative. The initiative was
apparently taken by the Katanga Com-
pany, controlled by the societe Gen-
erale de Belgique, when they requested
of the government that their one-third
holding in the Special Committee be
granted them in shares and in real
property. According to a stUdy by the
Centre de Recherche et d'Information
Socio-Politiques this request was made
on June 24, 1960, and according tO a
study by Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin,
the Belgian colonial government ac-
cepted the arrangement on June 27,
1960, just three days before independ-
ence.16 The result was quite simple:
the new Congo government was de-
prived of a right that had resided, un-
used, in the Congo state structure for
sixty years. Control of Union Miniere,
and the other enterprises involved, was
retained in white European hands.
With the retUrn of one-third of the
Special Committee's shares to the Ka-
tanga Company, members of the Cape-
to-Katanga team hold a majority of
607,000 shares and can effectively pro-
hibit any influence from the minority
holding of 478,000 "public" shares.
As a matter of fact, because the
administration of these companies re-
mained entirely under the control of
Europeans and because financial trans-
actions take place in Europe and not
in the Congo, it was even possible for
them to withhold from the Congo
government the revenues due it in
dividends, royalties, and taxes. Against
the argument that Union Miniere was
being forced by Tshombe to pay these
to his regime there is the fact that all
this started long before Tshombe
showed any signs of seceding and cer-
tainly before he acquired the power to
force anyone to do anything. What-
ever the case there, the situation dem-
onstrates a strengthening of the power
position of the essentially private sys-
tem of mineral exploitation by a de-
liberate weakening of public govern-
mental bodies. The Congo government
of 1963 dare not tamper with the min-
eral rights that, once public, are now
somehow «owned" by the Cape-to-
Katanga team, because the Congo gov-
ernment is financially dependent on
these large corporations, and on the
u. S., the u. N., and Belgium. These
are the Congo's only available sources
for capital and technical assistance nec-
essary to further economic develop-
ment.17
It is important to note that not only
was the African government weakened,
but the Belgian government, too, was
affected by "decolonization:' With its
control of the Special Committee of
the Katanga, and by virtue of its sover-
eignty over the Congo government
which possessed significant sharehold-
ings in other mining concerns, the
Belgian state had considerable leverage
it could apply toward controlling such
corporate giants as the societe Gen-
erale at home. The dissolution of this
Special Committee just before Congo-
lese independence, then, resulted not
only in stripping the new Congolese
state of much of its potential to influ-
ence the mining industry but also in
diminution of the Belgian state in this
regard.
We have already referred to some
aspects of the relations between state
and private business in the Rhodesias.
The effects of dissolution of the Fed-
17 A much fuller discussion of the Con-
go's problems will be found in the au.
thor's "The Congo: Economics, Possibility
for Viability'. to be published in The Pro-
ceedings of the Conference on Southern
Africa by The American Society of Afri-
can Culture.16 Joye and Lewin, op. cit.
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eration and the granting of political
independence tO Zambia and Malawi
are in the direction also of weakening
state power relative tO supranationally
organized "private enterprise." None
will doubt, I presume, that the United
Kingdom, in giving up political con-
trol over these territories, is a weaker
state in that it loses any legal right to
regulate matters there. But how about
the power of the new state of Zambia
(Northern Rhodesia) ?
Zambia, like the Congo and every
other African state, has as a primary
goal economic growth. It must, then,
attract capital from capital-exporting
countries and it must foster capital
formation from profits of its estab-
lished firms. Minerals are the prime
source of wealth, and the mineral
rights are held by the British South
Africa Company. It is that stalwart of
the supranational system that grants
concessions to new firms. Should the
Zambian government consider nation-
alization of the mineral rights, a num-
ber of consequences would ensue. Un-
der present world conditions, western
capital sources both private and public
would dry up, unless the state paid
heavily for these rights. Second, the
United Kingdom would apparently
take some action, for Her Majesty's
Government in 1962, according to the
late Lord Robins, assured the company
that it would be in a position to pro-
tect the company's mineral rights for
another twenty-four years regardless of
constitutional developments.18 Certain-
ly, the government of Zambia, alone,
is no match for the B.S.A. with or
without the support of the United
Kingdom.
The government of the Federation
was, as we have seen, a fairly influen-
tial government, with control of the
Railways and the Kariba Project, with
a sizeable army and more diversified
sources of revenue than any of its
constituent territories alone. But with
that state ( the Federation) dissolved,
that particular public power is gone
completely. Up tO May, 1963, the only
hint of the disposition of those twO
important public units, the Rhodesia
Railways and the Kariba Power Proj-
ect, is the statement by Minister
Kaunda of Zambia that he favors turn-
ing them over tO "private financial in-
terests."19 It would be a great surprise,
indeed, if they should be tllrned over
to any private interests independent of
the supranational system here de-
scribed, especially since the Railways
bonds are held by the British South
Africa Company and the major users
of the power from Kariba are the
mining companies.
All the evidence that is in, so far,
supports our hypothesis that as politi-
cal empires dissolve, states become
weaker relative to the supranational
mining system.
One should take into account, finally,
the current trend toward relaxation of
trade barriers-for example, the com-
mon market in Europe, and American
legislation to this effect in 1962. Di-
rected primarily at increasing economic
activity in ,r;eneral, the reductions in
tariffs and in national-state controls of
many kinds benefit especially those
firms already organized internationally.
The climate now provides legal sanc-
tion and popular support for their
supranational integration. and they,
18 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Netllsletter, Federal Information Depart-
ment, Salisbury, March 30, 1962, p. 3 :
"The President of the British South Africa
Company, Lord Robins, said on March 22
he had been assur~,1 that the British Gov-
~rnm~nt would b~ in a position to prot~<."t
his company's Northern Rhodesiall mineral
rights under the territory's new constitution,
Addressing th~ company's annual meeting
in London, Lord Robins said the British
South Africa Company would continue to
own the mineral rights in Northern Rho-
desia for a further 24 years."
III Ke111leth KaullJa, ill pr"~~ lollf"r"lIl"
reported in Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland Newsletter, January 25, 1963.
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more than "local" firms, are in a posi-
tion tO adapt to the widening markets
provJded. "Gross national product" had
already been illusory insofar as such
productive units as those engaged in
the African mineral industry were con-
cerned. The corporations of this group
are registered in many different states,
and are owned and directed by persons
of diverse nationalities.2° Where one
or another is registered, or where one
or another director is citizen, has little
to do with economic facts, to which
legalisms often bow. The societe Gen-
erale de Belgique, during World War
II, had directors resident in both Axis
and Allied territories without, appar-
ently, any disruption of their opera-
tions. That South Africa's withdrawal
from the Commonwealth involved no
change in her trade and financial ar-
rangements with the United Kingdom
is also a case in point. Similarly, the
politically inspired resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly call-
ing for trade boycott of South Africa
has virtually no economic conse-
quences. The supranational integration
in the economic sphere tends more and
more to supersede the political, inter-
national, ties or cleavages. Nations are,
in a very real sense, becoming more
interdependent. The concept of "na-
tional economy" may be an illusion
which must be given up if we are to
understand the new world of indus-
trial systems.
20 The first 107 companies on which I
collected data of this kind were registered
as follows: 49 in South Africa, 16 in
Northern Rhodesia, 9 in the United King-
dom, 7 in Belgium, 7 in Congo, 7 in the
United States, 5 in Southern Rhodesia, 3
in Portugal, 3 in Canada, 1 in Tanganyika.
These proportions should not -be over-
emphasized, however, since the system does
not have definite limits, and the observer
could bias the sample. One interesting ob-
servation, however, is that French com-
panies seem poorly represented. Could this
have anything to do with France's negative
attitude toward Britain's entry into the
Common Market?
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CONCLUSIONS
The Tallensi of northern Ghana
maintained a decentralized "political"
system without sharp boundaries by
symbolizing the "dimension" of people
in one kind of leader ( na' am-Chief
of the Land's People) and the «dimen-
sion" of land in another (tendaana-
Custodian of the Earth) .21 While both
have an interest in what Fortes calls
"prospering the community," neither
kind of leader can do so without the
collaboration of the other. My observa-
tions of the operation of the mineral
industry of southern Africa suggest
that, at the level of socio-cultural inte-
gration we are now approaching in
the West, at any rate, national states,
with their territorial basis, represent
the "dimension" of land and people,
while corporations represent the "di-
mension" of capital which is not ter-
ritorially based. While both have an
interest in "prospering the communi-
ty" neither can do it alone. In such a
system national states and supranation-
al corporations would interact on
something like an equal basis in a de-
centralized structure.
In order to understand the world
that is r!lpidly becoming industrialized
we ought to consider the changing
ecological circumstances this indus-
trialization entails. We ought, also, to
open our minds to the possibility that
cultural evolution may not have ended
with the development of st!lte institu-
tions. If we organize our observations
of recent history in the comparative
perspectiv~ of anthropological theory
we may discern some principles and
structures, however incipient, of an
emerging new and higher level of so-
ciocultural integration. In this field
anthropology has something to offer
as well as something tO learn.
21 Meyer Fortes, "T
can Political System,
Fortes and E. E. Eva!
1940.
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